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Commentary: Implications of Professor Scherer's 
Research for the Future of Antitrust 
Robert H. Lande· 
One way to test the accuracy of Professor Scherer's research is to 
compare it to the best previous work in the area. Prior to his current 
article the best analysis of the state of economic thinking_and knowledge 
during antitrust's formative period was presented twelve years ago by-
Professor Scherer.· This was a skeletal precurser to the well-documented 
version that he now presents, but his overall conclusions are identical. 
During the twelve years since his conclusions were presented in the Yale 
Law Journal no one has demonstrated that his research is in any way 
faulty or misleading, even though many have had a strong incentive to do 
so. We have, in effect, a "market test" validation of his thesis (in addi-
tion to the extraordinary modest critique I can provide). I therefore will 
primarily discuss why his conclusions are so important for the future of 
antitrust. 2 
ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE IN 1890 
To vastly oversimplify, economists today know that trusts, cartels 
and monopolies (hereinafter trusts) can cause three basic categories of 
economic effects. First, they can cause positive or negative effects on 
firms' productive efficiency.3 In addition, trusts can enable firms to ac-
quire market power, and market power causes two types of economic 
effects: allocative inefficiency and the transfer of wealth from consumers 
to the trustS.4 
• Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful to Alan Fisher 
and David Levy for insightful comments on an earlier draft. 
1. Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974 (1977); 
see a/so Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. EcON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 
I (1982}(explaining the views of economists when Congress passed the antitrust acts). 
2. Much of the historical material in this commentary is based upon research first presented in 
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpre-
tation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). 
3. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 13-21 (2d ed. 1980). 
4. The line between allocative inefficiency and wealth transfers is sometimes blurry. For ex-
ample, wealth transfers 'may be converted into inefficiency if the producers protect or enhance their 
power through rent-seeking behavior. See Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies. and 
Theft, 7 W. EcON. J. 224 (1967). Judge Posner hypothesized: 
[A]n opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form of monopoly profits 
will attract real resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize, and by consumers to pre-
vent being charged monopoly prices. The costs of the resources so used are costs of mo-
nopoly just as much as the costs resulting from the substitution of products that cost' 
society more to produce than the monopolized product. 
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVE II (1976). Posner notes that this 
effect might also cause consumers or actual or potential competitors of the monopolist to waste 
resources. Id. at ll-12. 
Professors Caves and Porter similarly show that monopolies often channel their competitive 
activities into activities such as advertising to create entry barriers that help to preserve their monop-
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Professor Scherer shows that the economics profession has for more 
than a century possessed a relatively sophisticated understanding of 
many of the effects of trusts on productive efficiency.s In 1890 econo-
mists also understood the wealth transfer (or distributive) effects of mar-
ket power quite well. 6 But the allocative inefficiency effects of market 
power' were virtually unknown, even within the economics profession, 
when the Sherman Act was passed. 8 
This is important not just for historical value. The knowledge of the 
oly position. Caves & Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers: Conjectural Decisions and 
Contrived Deference to New Competition, 91 Q.J. EcON. 241, 245·54 (1977). 
Professor Liebenstein believes that the motivations and incentives of workers and managers are 
different when their firm does not have face to face competition: 
In situations where competitive pressure is light, many people will trade the disutility 
of greater effort, of search, and the control of other peoples' activities for the utility of 
feeling less pressure and of better interpersonal relations. But in situations where competi-
tive pressures are high, and hence the costs of such trades are also high; they will exchange 
less of the disutility of effort for the utility of freedom from pressure, etc. 
Liebenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency, 56 AM. EcON. REV. 392, 413 (1966). 
Similarly, monopolieS can create "organizational slack" by tolerating inefficiency and waste. 
Without the discipline of competition, monopolies may have less incentive to cut waste or search for 
ways to reduce costs. Professor Scherer believes it is "eminently plausible" that inefficiencies result-
ing from weak competitive pressures "are at least as large as the welfare losses from [allocative 
inefficiency]." See F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 466. 
Of course, many do not believe that the above phenomena occur to a significant degree and 
consequently believe· that monopolies continue to enjoy their full monopoly profits. But if these 
effects do occur, some or all of the resources that otherwise are thought to be transferred from 
consumers to the monopolist instead would constitute additional inefficiencies from market power. 
5. Marshall observed that the monopoly price can even be lower than the competitive price, 
particularly in the long run, if the monopolist can increase innovation without sharing the benefits of 
any advances made, is more efficient, wastes less in advertising, or has greater access to capital. A. 
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF EcONOMICS 484 (1st ed. 1890). 
6. See, e.g., id. at 484. In his chapter entitled "The Theory of Monopolies," Marshall gave 
considerable attention to the distributive (wealth transfer) effects of trusts. [d. In addition, Marshall 
demonstrated that a monopolist will reduce supply to maximize profit: ' 
[d. 
The monopolist would lose all his Monopoly Revenue if he produced for sale an amount so 
great that its supply price, as here defined, was equal to its demand price: the amount 
which gives maximum Monopoly Revenue is always considerably less than that. It may 
therefore appear as though the amount produced under a monopoly is always less and its 
price to the consumer always higher than if there were no monopoly. 
7. The allocative efficiency effects of market power are complex. For a discussion and formal 
proof that market power leads to allocative efficiency, see E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THE-
ORY AND ApPLICATIONS 277-92 (4th ed. 1982); O. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 78-81 (1966). 
8. See A. MARSHALL, supra note 5, at 466-67 n I. This obscure footnote in effect discusses 
allocative inefficiency, so one can only say that the concept was virtually unknown in 1890. How-
ever, Marshall's discussion of how monopoly pricing leads to economic inefficiency will not win any 
prizes for effective communication. The accompanying text reads: 
If the Consumers' Rent which arise from the sale of the commodity at any price, is added 
to the Monopoly Revenue derived from it, the sum of the two is the money measure of the 
net benefits accruing from the sale of the commodity to producers and consumers together, 
or as we may say the TOTAL BENEFIT of its sale. And if the monopolist regards a gain 
to the consumers as of equal importance with an equal gain to himself, his aim will be to 
produce just that amount of the commodity which' will make this Total Benefit a 
maximum. 
[d. at 466-67. This paragraph contains a call for a footnote that reads: 
In fig. (38) ~O', SS', and QQ' represent the demand, supply and Monopoly Revenue 
curves drawn on the same plan as in fig. (36). From P, draw P,F perpendicular to Oy: 
then OFP, is the Consumer' Rent derived from the sale of OM thousand feet of gas at the 
price MP,. In MP, take a point p. such that OM X MP. = the area OFP,: then as M 
moves from 0 along Ox, p. will trace out our fourth curve, OR, which we may call the 
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economics profession in 1890 sets the outer bounds for what Congress 
reasonably could have known when it passed the Sherman Act. If even 
the economics profession did not really understand the concept of alloca-
tive inefficiency in 1890, and certainly accorded it no special significance, 
it is incredible to assert that Congress's sole concern with market power 
was with its allocative inefficiency effects. Yet, as Professor Scherer re-
minds us, the dominant paradigm today is that the only goal of the ex-
isting antitrust laws is to increase economic efficiency, and the only 
problem with market power is that it leads to allocative inefficiency. 
EFFICIENCY AS THE EXPLANATION FOR ANTITRUST 
How did we get to this counterintuitive situation? We largely have 
Judge Robert Bork to thank.9 Bork wrote a highly influential article in 
1966 that analyzed the legislative history of the Sherman Act in detail. 10 
He concluded that Congress's only goal was to maximize economic 
efficiency. 
Bork first disposed of possible socio-political concerns. Regardless 
whether these considerations explained why Congress was angry at the 
trusts, Bork asserted that they did not reflect what Congress actually 
meant to accomplish when it passed the Sherman ACt. 11 Bark then 
presented a number of quotations showing that Senator Sherman and the 
other legislators appreciated the productive efficiency benefits of the 
trustS.12 After all, Congress was aware that trusts often brought capital, 
management and business expertise to an industry, and could introduce 
and finance large-scale efficient production. Congress applauded the effi-
ciency of large, modem corporations. 
If Congress ~ppreciated trusts' efficiency, what was the legislature's 
CONSUMERS' RENT CURVE. (Of course it passes through 0, because when the sale of 
the commodity is reduced to nothing, the Consumers' Rent also vanishes). 
Next from P3P, cut OffP3P5 equal to MP. so that MP5 = MP3 + MP •. Then OM X 
MP5 = OM X MP3 + MP X MP.: but OM X MP3 is the total Monopoly Revenue when 
an amount OM is being sold at a price MP" and OM x MP. is the corresponding Con-
sumer' Rent. Therefore OM x MP5 is the sum of the Monopoly Revenue and the Con-
sumer' Rent, that is the (money measure of the) Total Benefit which the community will 
derive from the commodity when an amount OM is produced. The locus of P5 is our fifth 
curve, QT, which we may call the TOTAL BENEFIT CURVE. It touches one of the 
Constant Revenue Curves at t5, and this shows that the (money measure of the) Total 
Benefit is a maximum when the amount offered for sale is OW; or, which is the same thing, 
when the price of sale is fixed at the demand price for ow. 
Id. at 466-67 n. I (emphasis added)(diagram omitted). 
Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson reflected on the state of knowledge concerning the allocative 
inefficiency that results from prices above the competitive level (the competitive level is where price 
equals marginal cost) in the economics profession during the mid 1930s, before pathbreaking work 
by the late Abba P. Lerner: "I can testify that no one at Chicago or Harvard could tell me in 1935 
exactly why P=MC was a good thing, and I was a persistent Diogenes." Samuelson, A.P. Lerner at 
Sixty, 31 REV. ECON. STUD. 169, 173 (1964). 
9. Lande, supra note 2, passim. 
10. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcON. 7 (1966). 
II. Id. at 41-44. 
12. Id. at 26-31. 
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complaint? Why did Congress pass the Sherman Act? The answer is 
market power. Bork presented many quotations from the Act's legisla-
tive history showing that Congress disapproved when trusts used their 
market power to raise price and restrict outpUt. 13 He then asked what 
could be wrong with market power. The answer, according to Bork, was 
that market power causes allocative inefficiency.14 
Notice Bork's leap of logic. He omits another possible reason why 
Congress might not have liked market power-market power transfers 
wealth from purchasers to the firm with the market power. 
Professor Scherer's common-sense counter to Bork's logic goes as 
follows~ In 1890, even the economics profession did hot really under-
stand, and certainly did not emphasize, that market power causes alloca:' 
tive inefficiency. IS Even a casual observer of the time knew that if price 
went up, those consumers who continue to buy will have some qf their 
wealth extracted by firms with market power. It therefore must have 
been the wealth transfer (distributive) effect of market power that was 
bothering the legislature. 16 
An examination of the Sherman Act's legislative history indicates 
that Professor Scherer is correct. The legislative debates over the bill 
that became the Sherman Act are filled with statements that embody a 
concern with wealth transfers, not economic efficiency. 17 Congress re-
peatedly condemned the trusts using emotion-laden language that em-
bodies distributive (or wealth transfer) concerns,18 not a concern with 
13. Id. at 15-16. 
14. Id. at 7, 9. 
15. Scherer, supra note I, at 979-81. Even if Congress had been aware of the allocative ineffi-
ciency effects of market power it might not have cared enough to pass the Sherman Act. The first 
estimate of the allocative inefficiency damage to the American economy caused by market power was 
presented by Arnold Harberger in 1954. If the results of Harberger's estimates were expressed in 
terms of 1989 dollars, they would amount to roughly $20.00 per person per year. See Harberger, 
Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. EcON. REV. 77 (1954). Since Harberger's estimate is 
based upon a variety of assumptions it is hardly surprising that other economists arrive at different 
estimates, some of which are lower than Harberger's, while others are larger (some even by a factor 
of 50). See F. SCHERER, supra note 3, at 464. The more important question is what the magnitude 
of this loss would be if there were no antitrust laws to act as both deterrent and corrective systems. 
It is probably impossible, however, to formulate a meaningful estimate of this figure. 
16. Scherer, supra note I, at 976-79. 
17. See Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 429, 449-50 (1988). 
Senator Sherman termed monopolistic overcharges "extortion which makes the people 
poor," and "extorted wealth." Congressman Coke referred to the overcharges as "rob-
bery." Representative Heard declared that the trusts, "without rendering the slightest 
equivalent," have "stolen untold millions from the people." Congressman Wilson com-
plained that a particular trust "robs the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the 
other." Representative Fithian declared that the trusts were "impoverishing" the people 
through "robbery." Senator Hoar declared that monopolistic pricing was "a transaction 
the direct purpose of which is to extort from the community ... wealth which ought to be 
generally diffused over the whole community." Senator George complained: "Theyaggre-
gate to themselves great enormous wealth by extortion which makes the people poor." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
18. When we conclude that Congress passed the Sherman Act to prevent certain wealth trans-
fers, we have to carefully distinguish this transfer from the larger, overall distributive questions or 
we will enter a morass. Professor Elzinga published a brilliant article analyzing the problems that 
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allocative inefficiency. 
Neither Bork nor his followers are able to point to even one state-
ment in the legislative debates that looks remotely like a concern with 
what we today call "allocative inefficiency." They do not exist. Given 
the state of economic knowledge in 1890 this is not surprising. 19 
The best way to explain congressional intent is in terms of property 
rights or entitlements. Congress, by passing the Sherman Act, in effect 
declared that consumers should have the property right (or entitlement) 
to purchase products and services priced at a competitive level. Not 
priced at a low level, but at whatever level the competitive market brings. 
In other words, American consumers were entitled to one of the sweetest 
fruits of capitalism-competitively priced products and services. 
Given the rhetoric in the legislative history, an analogy to stealing 
would be apt. If I announced that I was going to try to steal Professor 
Scherer's wallet, society would attempt to prohibit my doing so on effi-
ciency grounds. But society would be much more likely to do so on the 
simple grounds that the wallet is his property, and my theft would consti-
tute an unfair wealth transfer, an unfair taking or extraction of his prop-
erty without compensation. Society almost certainly would condemn my 
action regardless of its efficiency consequences.20 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EFFICIENCY AND 
WEALTH TRANSFER VIEWS 
What are the implications of Scherer's conclusion that Congress 
passed the antitrust laws primarily for distributive reasons? If there is no 
likely prospect of market power it does not really matter whether anti-
trust centers around efficiency or wealth extractions; there would be no 
problem under either approach.21 Conversely, simple cartels would be 
attacked under either approach, either because they cause inefficiency or 
because they extract wealth from consumers. 
can arise when fairness or distributional considerations are incorporated into antitrust. See Elzinga, 
The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts, 125 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1191 (1977). For example, one could ask whether a particular group of consumers is rich or 
poor, or whether they are richer or poorer than the stockholders or workers of the firm that manu-
factures the products. Professor Elzinga demonstrates that if we start getting into these questions we 
become bogged down in vague and unanswerable fairness problems. [d. passim. Congress was not, 
however, concerned when it passed the antitrust laws with the overall distribution of wealth in soci-
ety. Congress merely wanted to stop one transfer-from consumers to firms with market power-
that is considered inequitable. Lande, supra note 2, at 93-96. 
19. Although I do not believe that the Congresses that passed the antitrust laws understood the 
concept of allocative inefficiency in any manner whatsoever, I do not mean to imply that these 
legislators were economically unsophisticated. Senator Sherman, for example, understood why entry 
barriers are so important to antitrust analysis: "[Ilf other corporations can be formed on equal terms 
a monopoly is impossible." 21 CONGo REC. 2457 (1890). 
20. We would prohibit this transfer regardless of its distributive consequences. Even if I am 
much poorer than Professor Scherer I still am not permitted to steal his wallet. 
21. Of course, we might condemn certain practices, such as horizontal price fixing, even in an 
absence of proof of market power, for jurisprudential reasons. 
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Any more complex case involving competing market power and effi~ 
ciency effects would, however, be greatly affected since the anticompeti-
tive effects of. market . power would be magnified. As a crude 
approximation of the difference this could make, focus on the relative 
size of the allocativeinefficiency effects of market power compared to the 
wealth transfer effects. Under the efficiency view, "what's wrong" with 
market power equals its allocative inefficiency effects. Suppose it is con-
cluded that Congress also w!inted antitrust to incorporate the transfer 
effects. Professor Scherer provided estimates of the relative sizes of the 
transfer and efficiency effects (with many caveats that I am going to leave 
out). He concluded that, on the average, the transfer effects of market 
power are probably at least as large, and perhaps are six times as large, as 
the allocative inefficiency effects.22 Judge Easterbrook recently assumed 
they might be twice as large.23 Using Judge Easterbrook's conservative 
estimate for simplicity, "what's wrong with market power" would be 
trebled if we also incorporate its transfer effects. Market power, in other 
words, was in the opinion of Congress approximately three times as 
"bad" as the efficiency school thinks it is. 
This reevaluation should lead to significant changes in many aspects 
of antitrust policy. For example, the wealth transfer concept has just 
started to have some explicit influence with respect to horizontal merger 
policy.' The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) 
Merger Guidelines explicitly rest upon the assumption that the principle 
problem with mergers is that they can lead to market power that will 
cause consumers to pay more for their goods.24 This is one of the reasons 
why the NAAG Merger Guidelines are somewhat stricter, especially in 
practice, than the federal Merger Guidelines. 
Two colleagues and I also have started to analyze the implications of 
incorporating wealth transfers into merger policy.2s Most merger analy-
sis by the federal antitrust enforcement officials during the Reagan ad-
ministration consisted solely of a balancing .of merger efficiencies and 
inefficiencies, and permitted price to rise so long as the resulting firm was 
(net) efficient.26 Suppose, however, we believe that Congress did not 
want to permit mergers that would lead to higher prices for consumers 
22. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE ch. 17 
(2d ed. 1980). 
23. Easterbrook, Panel Discussion, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 123, 126 (1986). 
24. "When a firm or firms exercise market power by profitably maintaining prices above com-
petitive levels for a significant period of time a transfer of wealth from consumers to those firms 
occurs. This transfer of wealth is the major evil sought to be addressed by section 7." Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General, [52 Special 8upp.] Antitrust & 
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at 8-4 (Mar. 12, 1987)(footnotes omitted). 
25. See Fisher, Johnson & Lande, Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 777 
(1989). 
26. This balancing is performed primarily through Merger Guidelines rather than on a case-by-
case basis. [d. at 810-18. But see Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (1980). 
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since this would entail a transfer of consumers' wealth to the firms ac-
quiring market power. Efficiencies would still be relevant since,ceteris 
paribus, they cim cause price to decrease. Under a price standard we 
would balance the downward pressure from potential efficiency gains 
against the upward pressure. from potential increased market power. To 
do this is extremely complex, but one safe conclusion that emerges is that 
a price standard, instead of an efficiency standard, should lead to signifi-
cantly stricter merger enforcement. 27 
In many other areas of antitrust, however, no one has even started 
to analyze the effects of incorporating a concern with wealth transfers. 
For instance, many examples of price discrimination might be evaluated 
differently since price discrimination has dramatic wealth transfer effects. 
What about tying arrangements implemented so the firm using the tie 
can price discriminate, or many instances of price discrimination that 
violate the Robinson-Patman Act? No one has ever done a good job 
analyzing these antitrust issues from a wealth transfer, rather than effi-
ciency, perspective.28 Similarly, many vertical restraints can be used to 
price discriminate or extract wealth from a firm at a different stage in the 
distribution process.29 In addition, recall the predatory pricing debate 
started by Areeda and Turner;3o their famous proposal was followed by 
an avalanche of articles by distinguished economists and lawyers, includ-
ing Professor Scherer, containing many sophisticated attempts to discern 
whether predatory pricing should be judged in terms of average variable 
cost, average total cost,.output, et cetera.3! To my knowledge, virtually 
all these analyses proceeded under an efficiency model. 32 Suppose we 
now attempt to determine the optimal standard towards predatory pric-
ing using a wealth transfer model. Would it make significant difference 
in our judgment as to the optimal rule? I do not know, but the profession 
should start to find out. 
Historical analysis can help set the bounds on what is appropriate 
for current antitrust analysis. Of course, history must be examined accu-
rately, especially to the extent that strict constructionism is appropriate. 
To illustrate the potential pitfalls from an incorrect use of the historical 
record, consider the mischief that could result from a literal reliance 
upon my favorite legislative history quotation (from the legislative his-
27. Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 25, at 815-18. 
28. The author currently is attempting to analyze the wealth transfer effects of tying arrange-
ments. See R. Lande, Untangling Tying (1990)(unpublished manuscript). 
29. This is similar to rent-seeking analysis. See supra note 4. . 
30. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1975). 
31. See generally Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 
VAND. L. REV. 63 (1982)(contains citations to and cogent analysis of many of these articles). 
32. The only predatory pricing analysis of which I am aware that even takes a token step in this 
direction is Zerbe & Cooper, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 
TEX. L. REV. 655 (1982). 
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tory of the Federal Trade Commission Act}. Senator Kenyon quoted 
Senator Martine for the proposition that "everybody should be permitted 
to kill one lawyer and not be punished for it."33 Fortunately, even ifthis 
were permitted we would still be able to rely upon the scholarship of 
nonlawyers like Professor Scherer. His. analysis of the knowledge of the 
economics profession during antitrust's formative years is extremely im-
portant. Lawyers and economists should begin to take his conclusions 
seriously and start to determine the differences this will make for 
antitrust. 
33. 51 CONGo REC. 13,196 (1914). Most economists love this quotation. They typically com-
plain, "Why only one?" 
